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Deutsch on the Epistemic Problem in Everettian Quantum Theory 
Leeds University 
David Deutsch (forthcoming) offers a solution to the Epistemic Problem for Everettian Quantum 
Theory. In this note I raise some problems for the attempted solution. 
 Everettian Quantum Theory is deterministic に it says that when a quantum measurement is 
made, the laboratory, scientists and entire world split into branches, and for each possible result, 
there is a branch where that result occurs. The big problem for Everettian Quantum Theory is how to 
make sense of what other versions of quantum theory identify as objective probabilities. These 
equations match our observations; if quantum mechanics says a result has a probability of 1/3, then 
repeated experiments show the result, on average, one time in three. 
 There are two roles for probability that we have to make sense of:  
 
The Practical Problem: How are we rationally to act, if we interpret quantum 
mechanics along Everettian lines? Suppose we are faced with a choice between, 
say, disaster on the spin-up branch and disaster on the spin-down branch. Given 
only that, whichever choice we make, there will be a disaster branch and a non-
disaster branch, how could we ever have grounds for choosing? 
 
The Epistemic Problem: How can we justify believing the theory on the basis of 
our empirical evidence, if we interpret quantum mechanics along Everettian lines? 
Given only that the theory predicted that the evidence that we have in fact 
observed would occur on some branch (and that the same is true of every other 
けヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWげ ゲデヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa W┗ｷSWﾐIWぶが ｴﾗ┘ I;ﾐ ┘W ヴW;ゲﾗﾐ;Hﾉ┞ デ;ﾆW ﾗ┌ヴ W┗ｷSWﾐIW デﾗ Iﾗﾐaｷヴﾏ 




Our focus will be the epistemic problem, but let me first note that Deutsch's proposal for the epistemic 
problem relies in part on the "decision-theoretic" approach to the practical problem (Deutsch 1999), 
so if the decision-theoretic approach is invalid, Deutsch's proposal for the epistemic problem 
presumably can't get off the ground. B┌デ ﾉWデげゲ ゲWデ デｴｷゲ ;ゲｷSW に I tｴｷﾐﾆ デｴ;デ W┗Wﾐ ｪヴ;ﾐデｷﾐｪ DW┌デゲIｴげゲ 
solution to the practical problem, his attempt to solve the epistemic problem fails. 
 Sﾗ ﾉWデげゲ ﾏﾗ┗W ﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW Wヮｷstemic problem. The standard Bayesian theory of confirmation says 
that: 
 
F confirms H iff P(F|H) > P(F)1  
 
What is our evidence according to Everettian Quantum Theory? As all results happen, it seems that all 
results have a probability of 1 i.e. P(F|H) = 1. On minimal assumptions2, it follows that P(F|H) > P(F), 
therefore the evidence is guaranteed to confirm H, whatever evidence is found. And this confirmation 
seems to be too easy. Sﾗ デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ゲﾗ ﾏ┌Iｴ けhow can we reasonably take our evidence to 
Iﾗﾐaｷヴﾏ デｴW デｴWﾗヴ┞いげが H┌デ must we always take our evidence to confirm the theory? How can we avoid 
easy confirmation? This is the epistemic problem. 
Deutsch (forthcoming) suggests an answer to this problem. Before getting to the details of his 
account, we should make explicit one of the interesting features of his approach. He rejects 
probabilistic theories of cﾗﾐaｷヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗa ; PﾗヮヮWヴｷ;ﾐ デｴWﾗヴ┞く ‘ﾗ┌ｪｴﾉ┞が ﾗﾐ DW┌デゲIｴげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞が 
scientific theories are explanations, and a theory should be rejected when it fails to explain an 
explicanda and a competing explanation succeeds in explaining the explicanda. 
Popperian theories deny the existence of inductive probabilities, which is both their strength 
and weakness. It is a strength because attempts to construct inductive probabilities are deemed to 
                                                          
1 I assume that 0 < P(H) < 1, which ensures the inequality in the text is equivalent to the more standard P(H|F) 
> P(H). See Salmon (1975) and Fitelson & Hájek (forthcoming). Iげ┗W ;ﾉゲﾗ Iｴ;ﾐｪWS the ﾏﾗヴW ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴS けEげ デﾗ けFげ デﾗ 
;┗ﾗｷS IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ DW┌デゲIｴげゲ けEげ aﾗヴ けE┗WヴWデデっW┗Wヴ┞デｴｷﾐｪげく 
2 Namely, assuming that 0 < P(H) < 1 and 0 < P(F) < 1, and that E confirms H iff P(H|F) > P(H). 
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have failed. It is a weakness because without inductive probabilities we can say so little about scientific 
theories に we cannot say that a theory is confirmed, or should be believed to any degree. The 
Popperian can be thought of as being especially epistemically cautious に even if a theory has survived 
attempts to refute it, we should still not believe it. Perhaps this is a price worth paying in order to 
avoid error. But there ｷゲ ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ ゲデヴ;ﾐｪW ;Hﾗ┌デ DW┌デゲIｴげゲ ;ヮヮW;ﾉ デﾗ PﾗヮヮWヴげゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ｴWヴWく  
Deutsch suggests that Popperian methodology can solve a problem に the epistemic problem 
in Everettian Quantum Theory に that Bayesian theories cannot. AﾐS I Sﾗﾐげデ ゲWW ｴﾗ┘ ;ﾐ┞ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ Iﾗ┌ﾉS 
be solved by Popper and not also solved by the Bayesian. For Bayesian theories are naturally thought 
of as logical strengthenings of PﾗヮヮWヴげゲ ﾏWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪ┞く PﾗヮヮWヴげゲ IWﾐデヴ;ﾉ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ に that theories are 
rejected when falsifying evidence is found に can be incorporated into Bayesian methodology に as the 
claim that H is rejected when E is found such that P(E|H) =0.3  DW┌デゲIｴげゲ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐゲ IﾗﾐIWヴning 
understanding scientific theories as explanations can also be incorporated into Bayesian methodology. 
Bayesian theories add inductive or subjective probabilities, allowing them to make further claims, such 
as that a hypothesis is confirmed by the evidence in non-extreme cases. And this addition can only 
add to the power of the theory. So it seems that anything that can be explained by Popperian 
methodology can also be explained by Bayesian methodology. So if the Popperian can explain how to 
update in an Everettian world, then the Bayesian should be able to as well, by applying the Popperian 
bit of their theory. 
B┌デ ﾉWデげゲ ゲWデ デｴｷゲ worry ;ゲｷSW ;ﾐS IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ DW┌デゲIｴげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞く He argues that there can be 
evidence that is not explained by Everettian Quantum Theory that is explained by a competitor.  
He first lays the groundwork by making the following claim about explanation: 
 
Criterion (i): ;ﾐ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ H;Sぐデﾗ デｴW W┝デWﾐデ デｴ;デぐ ふｷぶ ｷデ ゲWWﾏゲ ﾐﾗデ デo account 
for its explicandaぐ4 
                                                          
3 Compare Howson and Urbach 1993, pp. 119 




So if we are trying to explain something, say, a1 (the explicanda), then an explanation is bad to the 
extent that it seems not to account for a1. OﾐW ﾏｷｪｴデ ┘ﾗﾐSWヴ ┘ｴ;デ デｴW SｷaaWヴWﾐIW ｷゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ けW┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐげ 
;ﾐS け;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ aﾗヴげ. Why not just say that an explanation is bad to the extent that it fails to explain its 
explicanda? DW┌デゲIｴ SﾗWゲﾐげデ デWﾉﾉ ┌ゲが ;ﾐS I ┘ｷﾉﾉ ;ヴｪ┌W ﾉ;デWヴ デｴ;デ ふｷぶ ﾏWヴWﾉ┞ ﾉW;Sゲ ┌ゲ ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ｷﾐ ; IｷヴIﾉWく But 
ﾉWデげゲ ヮヴWゲゲ ﾗﾐく 
Deutsch then describes the following example: 
 
Suppose...that two mutually inconsistent theories, D and E, are good explanations 
of a certain class of explicanda, including all known results of relevant experiments, 
┘ｷデｴ デｴW ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ;デｷI デｴｷﾐｪ ;Hﾗ┌デ WｷデｴWヴ ﾗa デｴWﾏ HWｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾗデｴWヴげゲ W┝ｷゲデWﾐIWく 
Suppose also that in regard to a particular proposed experiment, E makes only the 
everything-possible-ｴ;ヮヮWﾐゲ ヮヴWSｷIデｷﾗﾐぐaﾗヴ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲ ;ヱ が ;ヲ がぐが ┘ｴｷﾉW D ヮヴWSｷIデゲ ; 
ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ;ヱぐ 
OHゲWヴ┗ｷﾐｪ デｴW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ;ヱぐ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW IﾗﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ヮヴWSｷIデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa Hﾗデｴ D and E. 
Even so, it would be a new explicandum which, by criterion (i) above, would raise 
a problem for the explanation E, since why the result a1 was observed but the 
ﾗデｴWヴゲ ┘WヴWﾐげデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐWS H┞ D H┌デ ┌ﾐW┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐWS H┞ Eく 
 
But why doesŶ͛ƚ E explain the result a1? Indeed, E says that all possible results will be observed, so it 
says that a1 will be observed. So E does seem to explain a1 being observed. This is the heart of the 
problem. Deutsch needs to tell us how E fails to explain the result ;ヱく Iげﾏ not saying this cannot be 
done, just that Deutsch has not told us how. Why might E fail to explain a1? Perhaps we need to take 
into account that result a1 is observed only by agents on the a1 branch. Agents on other branches do 
not see a1, they observe a different result. Perhaps these other observations are not explained by E. 
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But Deutsch makes no mention of these post-measurement branches. Instead, he uses his 
proposed scientific methodology to tell us why E fails to explain a1. But I find his scientific 
methodology unilluminating. In fact he seems to lead us round a string of definitions. 
 Deutsch tells us that, given E, a1 is expected not to happen, even though it will happen: 
 
under E5ぐa1 is expected not to happen, in the sense defined in Section 2 [see 
below], even though E asserts that, like every other [result], it will happen... This is 
no contradiction. Being expected is a methodological attribute of a possible result 
(depending, for instance, on whether a good explanation for it exists) while 
happening is a factual one. What is at issue in this paper is not whether the 
ヮヴﾗヮWヴデｷWゲ けW┝ヮWIデWS ﾐﾗデ デﾗ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐげ ;ﾐS け┘ｷﾉﾉ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐげ ;ヴW IﾗﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデ H┌デ ┘ｴWデｴWヴ 
they can both follow from the same deterministic explanatory theory, in this case 
E, under a reasonable scientific methodology. And I have just shown that they can. 
 
So Deutsch claims he has shown that, given E, a result both will happen and is expected not to happen. 
It is not clear to me that he has shown this. IﾐSWWSが I Sﾗﾐげデ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS ｴﾗ┘ ｷデ ｷゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWく 
 Quick clarification: There is usually nothing inconsistent with a result being expected not to 
happen and also happening. Every time you are surprised, something happened that you expected 
not to. Deustch is defending the consistency of a scenario much stranger than this. For according to E, 
a1 is guaranteed to happen. So Deutsch is defending the consistency of a theory which says that both 
a1 is guaranteed to happen and that a1 is not expected to happen. 
 De┌デゲIｴ SﾗWゲ ｪｷ┗W ┌ゲ ゲﾗﾏW ｴWﾉヮ H┞ SWaｷﾐｷﾐｪ ┘ｴ;デ ｴW ﾏW;ﾐゲ H┞ けW┝ヮWIデWSげ W;ヴﾉｷWヴ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮ;ヮWヴ, 
in the advertised Section 2: 
 
                                                          
5 Deutsch adds a striﾐｪ ﾗa ;ヱ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲ ｴWヴWが H┌デ デｴW┞ Sﾗﾐげデ ゲWWﾏ to play an essential role in his argument. 
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I ﾐﾗ┘ SWaｷﾐW ;ﾐ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗W ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐぐﾗa ┘ｴ;デ ｷデ ﾏW;ﾐゲ aﾗヴ ; ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS W┝ヮWヴｷﾏWﾐデ デﾗ 
be expected to have a result x under an explanatory theory T. It means that if the 
experiment were performed and did not result in x, T would become (more) 
problematic. Expectation is thus defined in terms of problems, and problems in 
terms of explanation, of which we shall need only the properties (i)... 
 
How W┝;Iデﾉ┞ ;ヴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ SWaｷﾐWS ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐい DW┌デゲIｴ ｷゲﾐげデ W┝ヮﾉｷIｷデく Hｷゲ (i) doesﾐげデ 
ﾏWﾐデｷﾗﾐ けヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏげく6 But (i) tells us when an explanation is bad (i.e. when it seems not to account for 
its explicanda), and presumably a bad explanation is an expﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ ; ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏく Sﾗ DW┌デゲIｴげゲ 
reasoning seems to be that a1 is expected not to happen according to E because a1 raises a problem 
for E; and a1 raises a problem for E because E seems not to account for a1.  
B┌デ ┘ｴ┞ SﾗWゲﾐげデ E ゲWWﾏ デﾗ account for a1? Indeed, E says that all possible results will be 
observed, so it says that a1 will be observed. So E does seem to account for a1 being observed. This is 
デｴW ゲ;ﾏW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ┘W ヴ;ﾐ ｷﾐデﾗ ;Hﾗ┗Wが ┘ｷデｴ けW┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげ ゲ┌Hゲデｷデ┌デWS aﾗヴ け;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ aﾗヴげく Sﾗ デｴW string of 
definitions does not seem to have helped.7 
It might be useful to quickly run through the dialectic. Deutsch said that E, the theory 
according to which everything possible happens, fails to explain a1. The objector points out that E says 
that a1 will happen, and asks why E fails to explain a1. Deutsch replies that E fails to explain a1 because 
E fails to account for a1. The objector then asks why E fails to account for a1. And no answer seems to 
be given.   
Deutschげゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ; Hｷデ ﾏﾗヴW IﾗﾏヮﾉｷI;デWS デｴ;ﾐ ﾏ┞ W┝ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐが H┌デ I Sﾗﾐげデ デｴｷﾐﾆ デｴW W┝デヴ; 
IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ｷデｷWゲ ｴWﾉヮく Iげﾉﾉ ﾏWﾐデｷﾗﾐ デ┘ﾗ ゲ┌Iｴ IﾗﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲく Fｷヴゲデが DW┌ゲデIｴ ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWゲ ; SｷゲデｷﾐIデｷﾗﾐ HWデ┘WWﾐ 
a methodological attribute of a possible result and a factual one, in order to make sense of how a 
result can be expected not to occur even though it is guaranteed to occur. HW SﾗWゲﾐげデ Wﾉ;Hﾗヴ;デW ﾗﾐ 
                                                          
6 Nor do (ii) or (iii). 
7 Iﾐ a;Iデ ┘W ﾏｷｪｴデ ｴ;┗W ゲデﾗヮヮWS ; ゲデWヮ W;ヴﾉｷWヴく TｴW SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けW┝ヮWIデWSげ ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa けヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏげ ;ﾐS けヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏげ 
ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa けW┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげ ﾉW;┗Wゲ ┌ゲ ┘ﾗﾐSWヴｷﾐｪ ;ｪ;ｷﾐ ┘ｴ┞ E a;ｷﾉゲ デﾗ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ a1. 
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what he means by this distinction. A factual attribute of a result seems fairly clear に it is a matter of 
whether the result occurs or not. What is a methodological attribute? It seems to be a matter of 
whether the result is expected to happen. But if so, we just have the problem re-phrased in new 
terminology. And anyway, it seems to be the wrong kind of distinction to solve the problem. I could 
imagine this distinction solving the problem if methodological attributes and factual attributes were 
probabilistically independent. Then a result being guaranteed to happen (factual) would have no 
relevance to whether it was expected to happen (methodological). But s┌ヴWﾉ┞ デｴW┞ ;ヴWﾐげデ 
probabilistically independent に methodological attributes such as being expected to happen are surely 
relevant to the factual attribute of whether it does happen. The greater the expectation 
(methodological), the greater the probability of it happening (factual). 
I suspect Deutsch would reject the use of probability in the last sentence, as his scientific 
methodology SﾗWゲﾐげデ ┌ゲW ｷﾐS┌Iデｷﾗﾐく B┌デ ┘W Sﾗﾐげデ ﾐWWS デﾗ ┌ゲW ｷﾐS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ﾏ;ﾆW デｴW ヮﾗｷﾐデ ;ヮヮﾉｷI;HﾉW 
to Deutsch, for he is only concerned with a case at the limit, where the probability is 1. Everettian 
Quantum Theory says that a1 is guaranteed to happen i.e. probability 1 (factual). And surely this is 
probabilistically relevant to whether it is expected to happen (methodological). To the extent that 
DW┌デゲIｴ SWﾐｷWゲ デｴｷゲが I Sﾗﾐげデ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS ┘ｴ;デ ｴW ﾏW;ﾐゲ Hy けW┝ヮWIデWSげく Tｴｷゲ ヮﾗｷﾐデ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ヴWデ┌ヴﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾐW┝デ 
paragraph. 
A second complication is that Deutsch talks about a series of results of a1, and claims that this 
series of results would be explained by D, but not by E. Tｴｷゲ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ DW┌デゲIｴげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ; ﾉｷデデﾉW ﾏﾗヴW 
intuitive at first. If we got a string of a1 results, we might be inclined to think that D is true and E is 
false. But remember that E says that everything will happen に including the string of a1 results. This 
perhaps draws attention to the fact that it is unclear what we should expect to see if Everettian 
Quantum Theory is true. Everettian Quantum Theory says that all possible results happen, but it 
SﾗWゲﾐげデ ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴｷﾉ┞ ゲ;┞ デｴ;デ ┘W ┘ｷﾉﾉ see all possible results happen. It says a1 will happen, but not that 
we will see a1. Indeed, we know that we wﾗﾐげデ ゲWW ;ﾉﾉ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲ in any normal sense に the agent 
on the a1 branch sees a1, the agent on the a2 branch sees a2, and so on. Deutsch goes further に saying 
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that Everettian Quantum Theory says we should not expect to see a1, nor a string of a1 results (at 
least if there is another theory D that does predict a1). But what should we expect to see according to 
Everettian Quantum Theory? This remains mysterious に ｷa け┘Wげ ヴWaWヴゲ デﾗ ﾗ┌ヴ ヮヴW-branching selves then 
┘W ｴ;┗W ゲ┌IIWゲゲﾗヴゲ ┘ｴﾗ ゲWW ;ヱ ;ﾐS ゲ┌IIWゲゲﾗヴゲ ┘ｴﾗ Sﾗﾐげデく Pﾉ;┌ゲｷHﾉ┞が ┘ｴWﾐ ┘W ｴ;┗W ﾏ┌ﾉデｷヮﾉW 
successors there is a break-down in our usual way of answering questions about what we should 
expect to see. A problem for Deutsch is that his answer relies on judgments about what we should 
expect to see. Without being told more about how Deutsch is thinking about what we should expect 
to see, it is difficult to understand his answer. 
Finally let me make a couple of points ;Hﾗ┌デ DW┌デゲIｴげゲ IヴｷデｷIｷゲﾏ ﾗa ゲデﾗIｴ;ゲデｷI デｴWﾗヴｷWゲく 
Deutsch's methodology rules out stochastic theories as fundamental explanations, but accepts them 
as useful approximations. He points out, I think correctly, that making use of stochastic theories 
requires adopting something like the following principle:  
 
(3) If a theory attaches numbers pi to possible results ai of an experiment; and calls 
デｴﾗゲW ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴゲ けヮヴﾗH;HｷﾉｷデｷWゲげき ;ﾐS ｷaき in one or more instances of the experiment; 
the observed frequencies of the ai differ significantly; according to some statistical 
test; from the pi; then a scientific problem should be deemed to exist. p.5 
 
But Deutsch rejects (3). His reasons are hard to follow. He first points out that (3) is normative, and so 
not a law of nature. Granted. He goes on: 
 
Nor, on the other hand, could it be appended to the explanatory scientific 
methodology I am advocating, for then it would be purely ad hoc: scientific 
methodology should be about whether reality seems to conform to our 
explanations; there is a problem when it does not, and only then. And one cannot 




But surely (3) describes a scenario where reality fails to conform to our explanations. The theory would 
explain results ai with frequencies pi; and if the frequencies of ai differed significantly from pi then 
reality would fail to conform to the explanation. The final italicized sentence is confusing. Of course it 
is correct that one cannot make an explanation problematic merely by declaring it so. But we are not 
attempting to make an explanation problematic by declaring it so に we are attempting to say what it 
is for an explanation to be problematic. Indeed, this is surely part of what Deutsch himself is doing 
with (i). 
 OﾐW a┌ヴデｴWヴ aW;デ┌ヴW ﾗa DW┌デゲIｴげゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲデﾗIｴ;ゲデｷI デｴWﾗヴｷWゲ ｷゲ ┘ﾗヴデｴ ﾏWﾐデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ に he 
seems to assume that the world is deterministic. He rejects the possible methodology for stochastic 
theories discussed above, and argues that ┘W I;ﾐ ┌ゲW ゲデﾗIｴ;ゲデｷI デｴWﾗヴｷWゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ┘ｴWﾐ デｴWヴW けｷゲ ; ｪﾗﾗS 
W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ ┘ｴ┞ ﾗﾐW I;ﾐ W┝ヮWIデ デｴW ｷﾐデWﾐSWS ヮ┌ヴヮﾗゲW ﾗa デｴW ﾏﾗSWﾉ デﾗ HW ┌ﾐ;aaWIデWS H┞げ (p.6) 
replacing an awkward or intractable property with the mathematical property of randomness. And he 
menデｷﾗﾐゲ けa game where the dice were replaced by a generator of random numbers に even though 
the latter is physically impossibleくげ (Italics added) p.6 
Deutsch may be of the solid conviction that God does not play dice, but one should not make 
this assumption in the debate about interpretations of quantum mechanicsが ┘ｴWヴW ﾗﾐWげゲ ｷﾐデWヴﾉﾗI┌デﾗヴゲ 
will disagree. And even if we do agree that God does not play dice, we can still ask the question of 
what our methodology should be (or should have been) if he did. Could we possibly find evidence that 
would lead us to believe that the world is indeterministic? In rejecting a methodology for stochastic 
theories, Deutsch suggests a negative answer to this question too, but the arguments given leave 
things very much open.8 
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